"BIG BANG" ENLARGEMENT AND COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM

Abstract

The article analyses the influence of the 2004 enlargement and of the 1998-2002 accession negotiations on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. In contrast to the dominant liberal institutional political economy models that explain preenlargement CAP reforms in terms of the negative trade related policy externalities, the common budget expenses and the specific role played by the common institutional setting, a critical realist explanatory model is proposed. In accordance with the model, the reforms were facilitated by the conflicting interests and the differences in capacity of the capital fixed to agricultural production in the member states and the candidate countries. The capacity of the agro-capital is defined by comparing the agricultural production structures, which were in the case of the old member states sustaining high levels of the fixed capital and which were in the case of the candidate countries, on average, underdeveloped and under-capitalized. The model is supported by the empirical analysis of the CAP reform and the accession negotiations process.